AZTEC Bug Bounty Program
AZTEC Protocol is offering a bug bounty for security vulnerabilities in their zero-knowledge smart contracts on Ethereum. Security researchers and developers should apply by submitting bug reports via email with steps to replicate. The program covers vulnerabilities in AZTEC.sol and aztecToken.sol contracts, with rewards determined at the discretion of Spilsbury Holdings Limited.
Eligibility: Open to security researchers and developers who can submit bug reports via email.
Pipeline
Funder track record · does AZTEC Protocol actually pay grants?
🟡 Some payout evidence · 1 grantee found · last payout 2023-09-14 · checked 2026-11-10 · 0 forum reports, 5 web pages read, 9 unverifiable claims dropped
Proven payer: at least 3 named grantees and one payout in the last 90 days. Every grantee below is quoted word for word from its source. When a source does not date a grant, the date is when that page or post was published.
| Grantee | Amount | Date | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| AZKR | — | 2023-09-14 page date | “we ultimately funded AZKR with an additional grant to generalize the work that's being done around private voting for NounsDAO” source |
| AZKR | — | 2023-08-14 page date | “we ultimately funded AZKR with an additional grant to generalize the work that's being done around private voting for NounsDAO” source |
Trust breakdown (2/3 checkable facts verified)
| Signal | Weight | Result | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| deadline | 0.35 | 0% | rolling claimed but not stated |
| apply link | 0.075 | 100% | link in source |
| funder | 0.075 | 100% | named in source |
| source quality | 0.15 | 50% | social or search hit |
| model confidence | 0.1 | 80% | model self-report |
Fit breakdown (against the ORG_* profile)
| Signal | Weight | Result | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| model fit | 0.5 | 10% | model rated 10% |
| ecosystem overlap | 0.25 | 0% | ethereum vs aleo |
| category overlap | 0.15 | 17% | security vs zk, privacy, infra, dev_tooling, security, interoperability |
| tech overlap | 0.1 | 0% | solidity vs rust, leo, zk |
Sources (1)
| Role | Document | From | Fetched |
|---|---|---|---|
| primary | Medium | Web discovery: ecosystem sweep | 2026-10-10 |
History (1)
| v | Changed | Fields |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2026-10-10 | created |
Extracted text
[Ethereum](/tag/ethereum?source=post_page---header_tags--a49a4e8f653e-----------------------------------------) # Announcing the AZTEC bug bounty, and a bug discovery [  ](/@aztecteam?source=post_page---byline--a49a4e8f653e-----------------------------------------) [AZTEC team](/@aztecteam?source=post_page---byline--a49a4e8f653e-----------------------------------------) 4 min read · Dec 3, 2018 [ ](/m/signin?actionUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fmedium.com%2F_%2Fvote%2Faztec-protocol%2Fa49a4e8f653e&operation=register&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fmedium.com%2Faztec-protocol%2Fannouncing-the-aztec-bug-bounty-and-a-bug-discovery-a49a4e8f653e&user=AZTEC+team&userId=fcf0cd0b3216&source=---header_actions--a49a4e8f653e---------------------clap_footer--------------------) \-- [](/m/signin?actionUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fmedium.com%2F_%2Frepost%2Fp%2Fa49a4e8f653e&operation=register&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fmedium.com%2Faztec-protocol%2Fannouncing-the-aztec-bug-bounty-and-a-bug-discovery-a49a4e8f653e&user=AZTEC+team&userId=fcf0cd0b3216&source=---header_actions--a49a4e8f653e---------------------repost_header--------------------) [](/m/signin?actionUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fmedium.com%2F_%2Fbookmark%2Fp%2Fa49a4e8f653e&operation=register&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fmedium.com%2Faztec-protocol%2Fannouncing-the-aztec-bug-bounty-and-a-bug-discovery-a49a4e8f653e&source=---header_actions--a49a4e8f653e---------------------bookmark_footer--------------------) [ Listen ](/m/signin?actionUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fmedium.com%2Fplans%3Fdimension%3Dpost_audio_button%26postId%3Da49a4e8f653e&operation=register&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fmedium.com%2Faztec-protocol%2Fannouncing-the-aztec-bug-bounty-and-a-bug-discovery-a49a4e8f653e&source=---header_actions--a49a4e8f653e---------------------post_audio_button--------------------) Share Press enter or click to view image in full size On the 29th of November, we announced proof of concept Zero Knowledge circuit built on top of Ethereum, and deployed to Mainnet. This contract was meant as an appendix to our cryptography paper. On Sunday 2nd of December, we discovered that the contract allowed a withdrawal of $30 of DAI, through a transaction exploiting both a sub-routine of the code which was left commented in the rush to share our work with the community, and by us not fully accounting for the behaviour of `ecrecover` (detailed below). > These two problems are from a bug in the demo implementation of the protocol — **the cryptography underpinning the protocol is formally sound**. At present, and until we conduct a full audit of the byte code with an external auditor, and detail the production trusted setup process, our **contracts remain use-at-own-risk**. While this case was found by our local testing suite, deployment was allowed to proceed without all the tests executing, in part due to our haste to share our PoC with the community. The $30 were placed there by the AZTEC team, and no third party was impacted. We have released [updated](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA43F8675850ac3f60A4D4cec954F1A1B0e1dbB07#code) [versions](https://etherscan.io/address/0xcf65A4e884373Ad12cd91c8C868F1DE9DA48501F) of our AZTEC smart contracts, with the relevant subroutines un-commented and the note owner validation subroutine fixed. ## Our next steps are as follows: * Update our deployment scripts to diminish the risks of similar human errors in future, by adding more test cases, minimal test coverage assertions and manual approval checkpoints * [Release our bug bounty program, which is detailed at the bottom of this medium post](/@_ArnaudS_/a49a4e8f653e#6eaf) ## Full exploit description On Saturday, we noticed a [transaction](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe7ed7b45a7e21a308722fc75b4b897607fed436a3e0d950f69dbdff8011a4945) to our zero-knowledge DAI smart contract which drained the smart contract’s DAI balance (30.6 DAI). Naturally this should not have been possible, we noticed two problems in our deployed proof of concept smart contract that have now been addressed. Our smart contract validator, AZTEC.sol, validates AZTEC zero-knowledge proofs by performing a series of elliptic curve arithmetic operations. There is a subroutine, `validateCommitments`, that checks that every input elliptic curve point is well formatted. It also checks that the integers used as inputs in the verification algorithm are well formed. Unfortunately, this validation function was not being called for every input because the function call was commented out. Despite a test case failing because of this commented piece of code existing on our local development environment, in our haste to deploy our smart contracts before the weekend we allowed for deployment to proceed without the full battery of tests being run. The second bug was present in our token smart contract, that created a confidential AZTEC note representation of DAI. The method `confidentialTransfer` takes a set of ‘input’ AZTEC notes and ‘output’ AZTEC notes, as well as an AZTEC zero-knowledge proof that the values of these two note sets are equal. As part of this method call, the `validateInputNote` subroutine is called on every input note. This subroutine checks that, for every input note, a valid [ECDSA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Digital_Signature_Algorithm) signature has been provided (the message of this signature is the AZTEC zero-knowledge proof, and it must be signed by the note owner). AZTEC notes are stored in the `noteRegistry` mapping, which maps note hashes to ethereum addresses (owners). Mappings on ethereum will by default return 0 if given a key which was not initialised. This means that given an invalid note as a key, the `noteRegistry` mapping will return address(0x0). Before being able to spend a note, the smart contract validates that the hash of said note in the `noteRegistry` maps to the address of the signer of the ECDSA signature provided in the transaction. The address of the signer of this ECDSA signature was recovered via the `ecrecover` solidity helper method. The bug in question was caused by us not fully accounting for the situation where the sender purposefully sends the ECDSA parameters which result in the `ecrecover` method to return 0. This results in the smart contract allowing the spending of any invalid note, since the hash of this invalid note will map to 0 in the `noteRegistry` mapping, which is the address recovered from the ECDSA signature. We have deployed fixed version of our proof of concept smart contracts to addresses 0xA43F8675850ac3f60A4D4cec954F1A1B0e1dbB07 (aztec.sol), 0xcf65A4e884373Ad12cd91c8C868F1DE9DA48501F (aztecToken.sol), which have addressed these problems. Please do not use the previous smart contracts as it is possible for an attacker to withdraw all of the DAI from these contracts. ## Pre-audit bug bounty program We have a planned audit with the ConsenSys Diligence team, before which AZTEC will remain in an alpha use-at-own-risk stage. Please note that any rewards will ultimately be awarded at the discretion of Spilsbury Holdings Limited, the UK registered company trading as AZTEC Protocol. ## Instructions for disclosure Please e-mail all submissions to [hello@aztecprotocol.com](mailto:hello@aztecprotocol.com), with the subject “BUG BOUNTY”. Please include steps to replicate the bug you discovered. To give the team time to fix the vulnerability, please do not discuss your findings publicly. We will respond with our expected timelines after we receive a submission.